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Abstract 
 
Given the recent theoretical development that documents stock market misvaluations' driven acquisition, this 
paper examines the relation between market valuations and bidder performance. We focus on hot stock markets and 
find that bidder reactions to mergers, in both the short and long-run period, are consistent with the predictions of 
investors' sentiment (optimism) after controlling for target type and method of payment. Managers that undertake 
mergers during bullish periods are rewarded by the generalized upward trend of the market in the short-run. 
However, this is followed by long-term reversals as the market learns only gradually that many of the mergers 
undertaken during hot periods were not carefully evaluated and were made under the pressure of 'urge to merge' to 
take advantage of the overall market status of a particular period.  
 
JEL classification: G11 ; G14 ; G34 
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1. Introduction 
Mergers and acquisitions have been one of the most extensively researched areas in finance with the 
most recent studies to document empirical evidence that merger activity comes in waves. The literature 
evaluates a merger based on the initial market reaction to the merger announcement (Jensen and Ruback, 
(1983)) and on the long-run returns to the merger (Loughran and Vijh, (1997)). Despite the fact that such 
corporate actions should be viewed as value-enhancing strategic decisions, the empirical studies have not 
always documented positive wealth effects for acquiring firms‟ shareholders. The neoclassical theory of 
mergers modernized by Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001), argues that merger waves emerge to an 
extent from economic, regulatory and industrial shocks. Given these shocks, mergers facilitate the change 
of firms to a new competitive environment. Merger activity comes in waves and returns to acquiring firms 
depend, among others, on the method of payment (Travlos (1987)), on the acquirer‟s book to market ratio 
(Rau and Vermaelen (1998)) and size (Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2004), and type of target (Fuller, 
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Netter and Stegemoller (2002)). A more recent strand of the literature attempts to link takeover activity 
with stock market performance (high merger activity is correlated with high stock market valuations as 
shown by Jovanovic and Rousseau, (2001)). This correlation is particularly interesting given that hot 
stock market periods, which could turn out to be misvaluations as shown by the growing behavioral 
finance literature, may impact merger activity in a systematical way.  
Studies on the wealth effects of mergers have documented a growing body of long-run anomalies, for 
example, cash payments systematically outperform stock payments (Loughran and Vijh, (1997)), value 
acquirers outperform glamour acquirers (Rau and Vermaelen, (1998)), small acquirers have, in general, 
better performance than large acquirers (Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz, (2004)). Along these lines, 
Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) develop models which suggest 
that stock market misvaluations drive merger activity. In their models, the fundamental assumption is that 
financial markets are inefficient and therefore some firms are valued incorrectly, while bidder managers 
are completely rational, understand market misvaluations and, hence, time the market to make profits. In 
addition, Rosen (2006) provides evidence that investors‟ reaction to a merger announcement during a 
particular period of time can be influenced by their overly optimistic beliefs about the future prospects 
which lead to merger momentum. Finally, Baker, Ruback and Wurgler (2007) survey a number of papers 
in behavioral corporate finance and provide a framework which suggests that investor sentiment co-exists 
with managerial overconfidence (hubris).
1
 
Given the fact that high merger activity correlates with high stock market valuations, the 
understanding of stock market valuations is crucial to shed light on merger activities and acquirers‟ 
performance. In particular, examining the short- and long-run market reactions to mergers in high- and 
low-valuation periods can facilitate to highlight the importance of market-wide valuations on acquiring 
firms‟ stock price performance and thereby draw conclusions on the ongoing debate of merger activities. 
If investors‟ sentiment (optimism) theory holds, bidders should enjoy larger abnormal returns during 
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high-valuation periods, because the overall state of the market rewards the managers for the „new 
information arrival‟ during a general upward trend, but this should reverse in the long-run as initial 
expectations may not be fully met when the combined firms‟ accomplishments become known over time. 
Also very importantly, while most, if not all, evidence of the recent debate on merger waves and 
market valuations is drawn exclusively from U.S. data, it cannot be ruled out that this is limited to the U.S. 
bearing in mind that these are a universal phenomenon. To determine whether this is not sensitive to the 
choice of the market and robust outside the U.S. we focus our attention on the other side of the Atlantic 
for U.K. new evidence. We use a sample of 2,973 U.K. domestic public and private acquisitions 
announced between 1984 and 2003, and examine the performance of acquirers both around the 
announcement date and in the post-merger period. We choose the U.K. as a representative sample of 
European evidence as Faccio and Masulis (2005) report that the U.K. accounts for the large majority of 
European deals (65.3% of their 13 European country mergers are U.K. bidders). In addition, since our 
study involves to a major extent the examination of method of payment, we are particularly interested in 
the fact that most U.K. bids are entirely cash financed (80.2% in Faccio and Masulis‟ sample) which goes 
against the market timing theory. This is in sharp contrast with the U.S. practice; Andrade, Mitchell, and 
Stafford (2001) interestingly report that 70% of U.S. deals are stock financed with 58% being fully stock 
financed.  
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, our results indicate that corporate 
acquisitions‟ performance is an integral component of market wide (mis)valuations. Second, the results 
support the predictions of overoptimistic investors‟ beliefs. We find that bidders generate significantly 
positive abnormal returns during high-valuation periods while they exhibit insignificant returns during 
low-valuation periods. This suggests that while the market rewards acquisition attempts when stock prices 
are high, it appears to be indifferent to acquisitions undertaken in low-valuation periods. On the other 
hand, bidders generate negative abnormal returns in the long-run for acquisitions initiated during both 
high- and low-valuation periods. Such results indicate that managers time the market and make profits at 
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the announcement, while they may overestimate the potential synergy gains and the future prospects that 
are associated with the merger decision. This over-optimism about the synergy gains and the future 
prospects of the merger is also adopted by investors, who increase the bidder‟s price at the announcement. 
The initial generally positive reaction of the market to high-valuation acquirers and the subsequent long-
run reversal reflect the market price corrections as investors learn only gradually that many of the mergers 
undertaken during bullish periods were imprudent and with less care. Third, in general, our results are 
robust to several acquisition and deal characteristics, industry shocks, past merger activity and merger 
waves. Fourth, we investigate whether our findings are a result of market-wide or firm-specific 
misvaluations and we conclude that the latter do not drive acquisitions for different valuation periods. 
Finally, we examine the pre-event performance of acquirers six months preceding the acquisition event 
and provide evidence that the reversal of patterns for the acquirers is not simply a manifestation of short-
term persistence and long-term reversals but mirrors the consequences of acquisitions during specific 
periods of market valuation. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the link between market valuations 
and bidder performance and sets the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and the empirical 
methodology. Section 4 presents and interprets the short-term results. Section 5 reports long-term 
performance results. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Related Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
A recent literature suggests that shareholder reaction to a corporate announcement can be affected by 
investor sentiment (optimism), that is, the reaction of investors to factors other than the value created by 
the merger. The investor sentiment theory advocates that merger performance results from overly 
optimistic beliefs on the part of investors. Merger momentum could result from investors as a group 
becoming optimistic about mergers announced during a particular period of time. Rosen (2006) argues 
that investors‟ reaction to a merger announcement can be influenced by their overly optimistic beliefs 
 4 
about the future prospects of the merger.
2
 Consequently, a common, positive trend in announcement 
returns to bidding firms should be observed during periods of market optimism, resulting in merger 
momentum, i.e. positive returns in the short-run. During hot merger markets, when optimism increases, 
bidders time the market to take advantage of the uptrend and hence, the market reaction to all 
announcements should be more positive than at other times. However, price increases should reverse in 
the long-run as the market realizes that mergers initiated in hot periods were not carefully evaluated and 
were in fact bad deals. 
Investor sentiment can also affect the type of acquisitions firms make. Managers may be infected with 
the same optimism as investors during hot markets. If this is the case, then they might overestimate the 
synergies from a merger, leading them to make more (ex post) bad acquisitions during hot markets, 
consistent with Baker, Ruback and Wurgler (2007) who argue that investor inefficiency co-exists with 
managerial irrationality. Alternatively, managers may use hot markets as a cover to exploit shareholders. 
If managers are rewarded for increasing stock prices, then they have an incentive to make bad 
acquisitions in hot markets, since even a bad acquisition may temporarily boost the acquirer‟s stock price. 
When this managerial motivation is important enough, mergers made in hot markets would be worse than 
those made in cold markets. 
Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) suggest a behavioral model, in which rational targets do not 
have perfect information and would accept a larger number of offers from overvalued targets during hot 
markets, because they overestimate the potential synergies of the merger. The difference between their 
model and the one of Shleifer and Vishny (2003) stands mainly in that target management is not just self-
concerned, but has only imperfect information about the magnitude of synergies at its disposal. In a 
different study, Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson and Viswanathan (2005) show that merger activity peaks when 
market valuations are high. In addition, they provide evidence of long-run reversal as they show that 
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history. Second, we use a U.K. sample while his analysis is based on U.S. data. Our findings are consistent with his arguments 
and point out that the effect of investors‟ optimism on acquirer‟s performance is not a U.S. phenomenon. 
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returns are lower in deals undertaken during hot merger markets than those announced at other times, 
given that initial expectations may not be fully met when the combined firms‟ accomplishments become 
known with time. 
When swings in acquirer‟s performance are caused by changes in investors‟ optimism, any increase in 
bidders‟ stock price should reverse in the long-run as beliefs are replaced by results. If managers make 
worse acquisitions in hot markets (because i) they are infected by hubris ii) pursue private benefits or iii) 
they optimistically overvalue target firms), then the long-run return to bidders might be negative even 
with a positive announcement return included. To sum up, the initial generally positive reaction of the 
market to high-valuation acquirers reflects that the market learns only gradually that many of the mergers 
undertaken during bullish periods were imprudent and not carefully evaluated. 
 
Hypothesis: Firms engaged in acquisitions under investors’ sentiment (optimism) theory generate 
positive announcement returns and negative long-run returns. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1. Classification of High- and Low- Valuation Markets 
Each calendar month is classified as high-, neutral-, or low-valuation month on the basis of the P/E 
ratio of the value-weighted market index (TOTMKUK).
3
 In order to classify each month into a valuation 
group the market (TOTMKUK) P/E is detrended by removing the best straight line fit (OLS) from the P/E 
of the month in question and the five preceding years. The month in question is classified into an above 
(below) average group if its detrended index P/E was above (below) the past five-year average. Then the 
months are ranked in order of detrended P/E. Months that belong to the top half of the above average 
group are classified as high-valuation months and those that belong to the bottom half of the below 
average group are classified as low-valuation months. All remaining months are classified as neutral-
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 Jovanovic and Rousseau (2001) find that merger waves coincide with periods of high price-earnings ratios on the stock 
markets, which is used as a proxy of market valuations. In an independent US study, Bouwman, Fuller and Nain (2008) also 
employ the P/E ratio of the market index (S&P 500).  
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valuation months. This procedure leads to 53 high-valuation, 63 low-valuation and 124 neutral-valuation 
months, respectively.
4
 
 
3.2. Selection Criteria and Sample Description 
We examine a sample of 2,973 successful domestic acquisitions by U.K. public companies over the 
period from January 1
st
, 1984 to December 31
st
, 2003.
5
 The sample of acquisitions is drawn from the 
Securities Data Corporation‟s (SDC) Mergers and Acquisitions Database. The following criteria are used 
in selecting the final sample: 1) Acquirers are publicly traded U.K. firms, listed on the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE) and have at least five days of return data around the acquisition announcement for short-
run analysis, and one- to three-year return data for the long-run analysis available from the Thomson 
Financial Datastream. 2) Targets are U.K. public or private firms. 3) The deal value is 1 million USD or 
more.
6
 4) The acquirer owns less than 50% of the target company‟s stock before the deal and more than   
50% after the deal. 5) We require that the deal value represents at least 1% of the market value of the 
acquirer. Market value is measured as monthly share price multiplied by the number of ordinary 
outstanding shares one month before the announcement date. 6) Both bidding and target firms are non-
financial and non-utility firms. 
In addition to these restrictions, multiple acquisitions (in which an acquirer announced two or more 
acquisitions within five days) are also excluded in order to isolate the overlapping effect among deals on 
bidder returns. The sample is then divided into three groups based on the payment method for the 
acquisition, i.e., pure cash, pure stock, and mixed. Cash acquisitions consist of transactions made solely in 
cash, or cash and debt. Stock acquisitions are defined as transactions made solely in common stock. 
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 Cross-border deals are excluded because we examine the performance of bidding firms as a matter of market valuations and 
the inclusion of deals made in foreign (non-UK) markets with different market/business cycles, corporate governance and 
regulations would contaminate the analysis. 
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 We follow Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002) and Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) and employ a one million 
dollars cut-off point to avoid results being generated by very small deals. 
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Mixed payment acquisitions include all acquisitions in which the payment method is neither pure cash nor 
pure stock, and methods classified as “other” by SDC.  
Table 1 presents the activity of acquisitions among public and private targets, value of acquirer and 
the value of deals stratified by the acquisitiveness of the acquirer, deal value and method of payment for 
the different market valuation periods. In numbers, 863 acquisitions announced during high-valuation 
periods, 1545 during neutral-valuation periods and 565 during low-valuation periods. Hence, higher 
acquisitiveness is a feature that characterizes high-valuation acquisition firms, as high-valuation periods 
are accompanied with greater merger activity (29%) than low-valuation periods (19%). Accordingly, the 
relative number of deals over the number of months in different market valuation periods is 16.28, 12.45 
and 8.96 for high- neutral- and low-valuation periods respectively. A result that emerges from the sample 
statistics is that a large fraction of U.K. acquirers engage in cash acquisitions (1609) compared to stock 
(172) and mixed payment transactions (1192) respectively, consistent with the findings of previous 
studies based on the U.K. takeover market.
7
 Another noticeable observation is that private firms comprise 
the vast majority of targets (2731) in contrast to the small number of publicly traded targets (242).
8
 With 
respect to the deal value, the percentage of total deal value for high valuation months (34%) is more than 
double when compared to low valuation months (15%), which corroborates the view that managers “urge 
to merge” under the pressure of a bullish market. Again in deal value terms, cash deals (47%) outweigh 
by far stock (21%) and mixed payment (32%) deals, while public targets exhibit a disproportional 
percentage of total deal value (45%) when considering their small contribution to the total number of 
acquisitions (8%). These findings could be also attributed to managers‟ overconfidence/hubris due to the 
fact that they: i) initiate acquisitions during high-valuation periods when the overall state of share prices 
is in very high levels; ii) use cash to reflect to the market their budget capacity or iii) buy large companies 
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(public firms are by far larger than private firms (more than double market capitalization)), taking the risk 
that such a transaction can entail.  
Table 1 
Summary Statistics of Acquisitions 
Type of Acquisition  
Number of 
Acquisitions 
% of Total 
Number of 
Acquisitions 
Mean Market 
Equity 
(£ mln) 
Mean Transaction 
Value (£ mln) % of Total Deal Value 
All Deals 2973 100 302.06 32.34 100 
      
High-Valuation 863 29.03 367.99 38.16 34.25 
Neutral-Valuation 1545 51.97 284.53 31.84 51.16 
Low-Valuation 565 19 249.30 24.83 14.59 
      
Cash 1609 54.12 352.25 27.97 46.81 
Stock 172 5.79 358.71 118.19 21.14 
Mixed 1192 40.09 226.14 25.86 32.05 
      
Public 242 8.14 895.72 181.48 45.67 
Private 2731 91.86 249.45 19.13 54.33 
      
High-Valuation Cash 472 54.69 454.42 37.69 54.02 
High-Valuation Stock 65 7.54 452.06 94.51 18.65 
High-Valuation Mixed 326 37.77 226.09 27.60 27.32 
      
Neutral-Valuation Cash 814 52.69 319.50 23.37 38.66 
Neutral-Valuation Stock 81 5.24 341.51 159.00 26.18 
Neutral-Valuation Mixed 650 42.07 233.63 26.62 35.16 
      
Low-Valuation Cash 323 57.17 285.47 25.38 58.51 
Low-Valuation Stock 26 4.60 178.88 50.24 9.31 
Low-Valuation Mixed 216 38.23 203.70 20.95 32.25 
      
High-Valuation Public 90 10.43 1126.40 179.75 49.12 
High-Valuation Private 773 89.57 279.69 21.68 50.88 
      
Neutral-Valuation Public 111 7.18 804.27 208.08 46.94 
Neutral-Valuation Private 1434 92.82 244.30 18.20 53.06 
      
Low-Valuation Public 41 7.26 636.96 113.24 33.09 
Low-Valuation Private 524 92.74 218.97 17.92 66.91 
This table presents summary statistics of 2973 completed domestic acquisitions made by U.K. publicly traded firms during the 
1984 to 2003 period. The table reports the number of acquisitions, the percentage of total number of acquisitions, the mean 
market value of acquirers and the mean transaction value of the acquisition. The last column shows the percentage of total 
value of transaction. Acquirers are publicly traded firms listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). Targets are UK public 
and private firms. Using monthly data from 1984 till 2003, each month is classified through this period as a high- (low-) 
valuation month if the detrended market P/E of that month belongs to the top (bottom) half of all detrended P/Es above (below) 
the past five-year average. All other months are classified as neutral-valuation acquisitions. The summary statistics are further 
divided by method of payment. Cash acquisitions include transactions made solely in cash, or cash and debt. Stock acquisitions 
are defined as transactions made solely in common stock. Mixed payment acquisitions consist of all acquisitions in which the 
payment method is neither pure cash nor pure stock, and methods classified as “other” by SDC. 
 
The cross-examination of valuation period and method of payment (Table 2, Panel A) verifies, very 
importantly, the well documented reluctance of the bidding firms to pay in stocks when they believe their 
stock is undervalued (Travlos, (1987)), as there are more than double stock acquisitions during high-
 9 
valuation markets (65) than during low-valuation markets (26) (corresponding to 19% and 9% of total 
deal value, respectively).
9
  
Table 2  
Financing Characteristics  
Valuation Period 
 Cash  Stock  Mixed  
Year Total 
Year N %   N  %  N  %  
Low 
1984 2 100%        2 
1985 2 67%  1 33%     3 
1988 66 65%  3 3%  32 32%  101 
1989 14 56%  3 12%  8 32%  25 
1990 83 65%  6 5%  39 30%  128 
1991 10 77%  1 8%  2 15%  13 
1995 20 49%  1 2%  20 49%  41 
1996 24 45%  6 11%  23 44%  53 
1997 4 33%     8 67%  12 
2001 3 25%     9 75%  12 
2002 36 51%  4 6%  31 43%  71 
2003 59 57%  1 1%  44 42%  104 
L Total  323 57%  26 5%  216 38%  565 
            
High 
1986 9 69%  3 23%  1 8%  13 
1987 55 63%  22 25%  10 12%  87 
1992 15 60%  1 4%  9 36%  25 
1993 27 39%  6 9%  37 52%  70 
1994 14 52%  3 11%  10 37%  27 
1998 118 66%  7 4%  55 30%  180 
1999 131 53%  10 4%  108 43%  249 
2000 103 49%  13 6%  96 45%  212 
H Total  472 55%  65 8%  326 37%  863 
            
Total  795 56%  91 6%  542 38%  1428 
This table reports financing characteristics by year of completed UK public and private acquisitions made by UK acquiring 
firms. Acquirers are publicly traded firms listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). Using monthly data from 1984 till 
2003, each month is classified through this period as a high- (low-) valuation month if the detrended market P/E of that month 
belongs to the top (bottom) half of all detrended P/Es above (below) the past five-year average. All other months are classified 
as neutral-valuation acquisitions. Cash acquisitions include transactions made solely in cash, or cash and debt. Stock 
acquisitions are defined as transactions made solely in common stock. Mixed payment acquisitions consist of all acquisitions 
in which the payment method is neither pure cash nor pure stock, and methods classified as “other” by SDC.  
 
3.3. Methodology 
For the short-run analysis, we follow Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002) standard event study 
methodology and calculate Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) for the five-day (-2, +2) period around 
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the takeover announcement.
10
 More specifically, we estimate the abnormal returns by using a modified 
market-adjusted model: mtitit RRAR  , where itR  is the return on firm i and mtR  is the value-weighed 
market index return. This approach amounts to assuming that  = 0 and  = 1 for the firms in our 
sample. 
To sidestep the problem of cross-sectional dependence of sample observations, we employ, similar to 
Mitchell and Stafford (2000), the Calendar Time Portfolio Regressions (CTPRs) analysis. We estimate 
the following model: ittitiftmtiiftpt HMLhSMBsRRaRR   )( , where ptR  is the average 
monthly return of the calendar portfolio, ftR  is the monthly risk free return, mtR  is the monthly return of 
the value-weighted market index, tSMB  the value-weighted return on small firms minus the value-
weighted returns on large firms, and tHML  the value-weighted return on high book-to-market firms 
minus the value-weighted return on low book-to-market firms. In addition, i , is  and ih  are the regression 
parameters and it  is the error term. The  is interpreted as the average of the individual firm-specific 
intercepts.   
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1. Acquirer Announcement Returns and Market Valuations: Univariate Analysis 
Table 3 presents five-day CARs by type of acquirer and method of payment. The overall sample 
amounts to a significant positive CAR of 1.17%,
11
 while the sample partitioned by valuation periods 
yields significant gains for high-valuation acquirers (1.66%) and insignificant returns (0.41%) for low-
valuation bidders, which suggests that acquirers were rewarded for such transactions in the former periods 
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 Since about 30% of the acquiring firms in our sample engage in frequent acquisitions within 200 days, previous 
announcements will be included in the estimation period and therefore market parameter estimations to an extent would be 
biased. However, we do also calculate CARs following Brown and Warner‟s (1985) standard event study methodology which 
yields qualitatively similar results that we do not report for brevity. 
11
 Such result supports the investors‟ sentiment (optimism) theory that predicts positive abnormal returns in the short-run. This 
result could also be explained by the neoclassical theory of mergers. This assumes that managers act to maximize shareholder 
value. If mergers are concentrated around common shocks that positively affect the potential synergies from all deals, then 
mergers following shocks should be better than others and this should be reflected in stock price increases upon a merger 
announcement. 
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only.
12
 The sub-analysis by target status shows a striking difference among public and private targets. 
Bidders of public targets generate significant losses (-1.35%) and those of private targets have significant 
gains of about the same level (1.42%) for the overall period.
13
 The greater acquirer return in private than 
public targets seems to reflect a liquidity discount for the assets of private targets. On the other hand, 
acquisitions of large listed firms could signal managerial „empire-building‟ incentives leading to negative 
reactions by investors (Draper and Paudyal, (2006)). However, when we examine the results by valuation 
periods we find that they are driven by the particular valuation conditions existed in the market since low-
valuation public acquisitions lose a significant CAR of -2.43%, while acquisitions undertaken during 
high-valuation months generate an insignificant return and at least do not lose. 
Acquisitions associated with cash and mixed methods of payment have abnormal returns of 0.93% 
and 1.67%, respectively, and are statistically significant at the 1% level while stock payments generate 
insignificant returns. Cash and mixed offers exhibit significantly larger gains in high-valuation periods 
than in low-valuation periods. Stock acquisitions result to a negative CAR for public targets in all periods 
(-2.99%), which aligns with the suggestion that a stock payment signals the bidder‟s perception of its 
overvalued stock. This effect becomes even more pronounced in unfavourable market conditions (-
5.97%). Further, the insignificant return of public acquisitions with stock in high-valuation periods shows 
interestingly that market valuations are over and above the method of payment and firm-specific 
overvaluation, assumed by the decision of the manager to time the market and pay by the overvalued 
stock. Finally, the higher abnormal returns from private acquisitions that involve stock financing for all 
valuation periods might reflect the blockholder benefits that might emerge from the acquisition.
14
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 For robustness reasons we calculate bidder returns using a second proxy of market valuations (the detrended market index 
(TOTMKUK) itself). Our results, which are not presented for brevity, are qualitatively similar and are available upon request. 
13
 This result is in line with the evidence of Chang (1998), Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller (2002) and Doukas and Petmezas 
(2007) who document substantial gains in acquisitions of privately held firms. Consistent with the U.S. evidence, U.K. studies 
(Draper and Paudyal (2006), among others) report negative and significant bidder abnormal returns for public acquisitions 
surrounding merger announcements. 
14
 For further discussion see Fuller et al. (2002). 
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Table 3  
Short-run Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) of Acquirers by Valuation Periods 
 
The table presents the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) for bidders that acquired public and/or private UK targets over the 1984 and 2003 period. Cumulative abnormal 
returns are calculated for the 5 days [-2, +2] around the announcement day (day 0) of a takeover. Abnormal Returns are estimated using a modified market-adjusted model: 
it it mtAR R R  , where itR  is the Return on firm i and mtR  is the Value Weighed Market Index Return. All acquirers are publicly traded firms listed on the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE). Results are partitioned by valuation period to acquisitions undertaken during high- and low-valuation periods respectively. Using monthly data from 1984 till 
2003, each month is classified through this period as a high- (low-) valuation month if the detrended market P/E of that month belongs to the top (bottom) half of all detrended 
P/Es above (below) the past five-year average. All other months are classified as neutral-valuation acquisitions. The results are further divided by the method of payment. Cash 
acquisitions include transactions made solely in cash, or cash and debt. Stock acquisitions are defined as transactions made solely in common stock. Mixed payment 
acquisitions consist of all acquisitions in which the payment method is neither pure cash nor pure stock, and methods classified as “other” by SDC. The number of bids is 
reported below the mean. H-L (High minus Low) column represents the differences in mean short-run CARs for the five days [-2, +2] around the announcement day (day 0) of 
a takeover. 
 a
 Denotes significance at the 1% level; 
 b
 Denotes significance at the 5% level; 
 c 
Denotes significance at the 10% level. P-values are provided in parenthesis. 
 All  Cash  Stock  Mixed  
 All High Low H-L All High Low H-L All High Low H-L All High Low H-L 
All  1.17% 
a
 1.66% 
a 
0.41% 1.25%
 a
 0.93% 
a
 1.29% 
a
 0.39% 0.90%
 b
 0.22% 1.00% -1.71% 2.71% 1.67% 
a
 2.32%
 a
 0.69% 1.63%
 b
 
 1428 863 565 (0.001) 795 472 323 (0.038) 91 65 26 (0.183) 542 326 216 (0.025) 
                 
Public -1.35% 
c
 -0.86%
 
-2.43% 
b 
1.57% -0.44% -0.01% -1.14% 1.13% -2.99% 
c
 -1.82% -5.97% 
b
 4.15% -0.98% -0.94% -1.12% 0.18% 
 131 90 41 (0.254) 55 34 21 (0.473) 39 28 11 (0.169) 37 28 9 (0.960) 
                 
Private  1.42%
 a
 1.96%
 a
 0.63%
 b
 1.33%
 a
 1.03%
 a
 1.40%
 a
 0.50% 0.90%
 b
 2.64%
 b
 3.14%
 c
 1.40% 1.74% 1.87%
 a
 2.63%
 a
 0.77% 1.86%
 b
 
 1297 773 524 (0.001) 740 438 302 (0.047) 52 37 15 (0.483) 505 298 207 (0.014) 
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4.2. Acquirer Announcement Returns by Relative size, Industry Diversification Book-to-Market and P/E 
Ratio: Univariate Analysis 
 
Table 4 reports acquirer abnormal returns after controlling for factors that affect the performance of 
bidding firms on a univariate basis such as the relative size of the target to bidder, industry diversification, 
book-to-market ratio and price-to-earnings ratio. We define the relative size of the target as the deal value 
divided by the market value of the acquirer one month prior to the announcement date. An acquisition is 
defined as diversifying when the acquirer‟s two-digit SIC code is different from that of the target 
company. Accordingly, all other acquisitions are classified as non-diversifying acquisitions. The next set 
of tests involves examining abnormal returns for bidders according to their book-to-market ratio which is 
defined as the net book value divided by market value one month prior to the announcement date. In 
addition, very importantly, we test the performance of firms with positive and negative P/E ratios 
compared to the market respectively to further enhance the argument that our results indicate market 
rather than firm-specific driven acquisitions. More specifically, we examine bidder performance of firms 
that had larger P/E ratio than the P/E of the market one month prior to the announcement and those that 
had smaller P/E ratio than the P/E ratio of the market one month prior to the announcement. If firm-
specific valuations drive acquisitions, we should expect that the above patterns should not stand. 
Our results for all bidders in both valuation periods are consistent with the literature, indicating that 
wealth gains to acquiring firms are declining monotonically with target size.
15
 Further, high-valuation 
acquisitions generate positive and statistically significant abnormal returns for all and private targets of 
small (1.26%) and large (2.73%) relative size, while only private targets have significant gains in low-
valuation periods (1.02%). The mean difference between high- and low-valuation acquisitions is 
statistically significant irrespective of the relative size of the target to bidder. Overall, regardless of the 
relative size of the target to bidder, acquisitions undertaken during high-valuation periods outperform 
                                                 
15
 Rosen (2006) suggests that the relative size of the merging firms affects the magnitude of the synergy. This view is in line 
with Jensen and Ruback, (1983), Travlos (1987) and Fuller et al. (2002) who show that announcement returns increase with the 
target‟s relative size to the bidder. 
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those initiated during low-valuation periods and drive acquirer‟s overall positive performance in the 
short-run. 
Conglomerate expansion is suggested to be driven by managerial „empire building‟ motives as well as 
a way of easily meeting growth expectations rather than representing a value-enhancing investment 
opportunity, a notion that should be reflected in the stock market by the underperformance of diversifying 
acquisitions. A common finding among several previous studies is that diversifying acquisitions destroy 
shareholder value.
16
 Interestingly, a comparison of Panels A and B of Table 4 reveals that the mean 
differences in abnormal returns for all bidders and valuation periods appear to be opposite to those 
predicted by corporate finance theory. Diversifying acquisitions in high-valuation months produced 
significant abnormal returns of 2.22% as opposed to non-diversifying ones that generate CARs of 1.19%. 
Moreover, in low-valuation months, bidders that undertake diversifying acquisitions earn a significant 
CAR of 0.62%, whereas non-diversifying acquisitions do not generate significant abnormal returns. The 
significance pattern of periods mean difference is again repeated in diversifying acquisitions as high-
valuation acquisitions outperform low-valuation acquisitions irrespective of the target status and, in most 
cases, the method of payment. For non-diversifying acquisitions the pattern is almost similar. 
Further, it has been acknowledged in the literature that the book-to-market ratio of acquiring firms is 
related to the announcement returns, as it conveys important information about past and potential future 
bidder‟s stock performance. Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1989) provide evidence that high book-to-market 
ratio is associated with a larger announcement CAR. Rau and Vermaelen (1998) suggest that glamour 
acquirers (i.e., acquirers with low book-to-market ratio) outperform value ones (i.e., acquirers with high 
book-to-market ratio) in the short-run. It appears that the market fails to understand that past managerial 
performance is not necessarily a good indicator of future performance, at least in the case of acquisitions. 
Table 4 illustrates that firms with low growth opportunities (low book-to-market ratio) generate 
                                                 
16
 See, for example, Lang and Stulz (1994). However, Jensen and Ruback (1983) find that the announcements of diversifying 
acquisitions are generally associated with small positive abnormal returns. 
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significantly larger abnormal returns during high-valuation periods than low-valuation periods (the mean 
difference for all and private acquisitions is significant at the 1% level) presumably due to market over-
optimism towards glamour firms in the former period. The returns of high book-to-market acquisitions 
show that high-valuation bids outperform low-valuation bids on average (the mean difference is 
statistically insignificant). The market seems to favor reputation in bidders during high-valuation periods, 
but ignores valuation conditions when reacting in high book-to-market bids. This observation could be 
attributed to „glamour‟ firms‟ managers attempt to time the market and use their firm‟s valuation 
advantage. Overall, our results are robust after controlling for book-to-market effect providing evidence 
that returns on particular periods (bullish periods) drive the overall acquirer‟s performance. Finally, we 
find that bidders generate significantly larger abnormal returns during high-valuation periods than low-
valuation periods for all and private acquisitions in the positive P/E portfolio. This pattern sustains also 
for the negative P/E group, indicating that our results are over and above firm-specific misvaluations. 
Table 4 
Short-run Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) of High-Valuation Vs Low-Valuation Acquirers by the Relative Size of the 
Target, Diversifying/Non-Diversifying Acquisitions, Book-To-Market (B/M) Ratio and Price-To-Earnings (P/E) Ratio 
 
The table presents the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) for bidders that acquired public and/or private UK targets over 
the 1984 and 2003 period. Cumulative abnormal returns are calculated for the 5 days [-2, +2] around the announcement day 
(day 0) of a takeover. Abnormal Returns are estimated using a modified market-adjusted model: 
it it mtAR R R  , where itR  is 
the Return on firm i and 
mtR  is the Value Weighed Market Index Return. All acquirers are publicly traded firms listed on the 
London Stock Exchange (LSE). Panel A represents acquisitions with small relative size of target to bidder, diversifying 
acquisitions, high book-to-market ratio and positive P/E ratio and Panel B acquisitions with large relative size of target to 
bidder, non-diversifying acquisitions, low book-to-market ratio and negative P/E ratio respectively. The relative size of the 
target is defined as the deal value divided by the market value of the acquirer. The Acquirer Market Value (MV) is the monthly 
share price multiplied by the number of ordinary shares (as reported in Datastream) the month before the announcement date. 
We rank acquirers‟ relative size (deal value to acquirer‟s market value one month prior to the announcement date) and then we 
classify the ones above (below) the sample relative size median as large (small) relative size. An acquisition is defined as 
diversified when the acquirer‟s two-digit SIC code is different from that of the target company. Bidder‟s book-to-market ratio 
is the net book value divided by its market value and is estimated one month before the acquisition announcement date. We 
rank acquirers‟ book-to-market values and then we classify the ones above (below) the sample book-to-market median as high 
(low) B/M acquirers. Positive (negative) P/E ratio represents bidders that had larger (smaller) P/E ratio than the market one 
month prior to the announcement. Results are partitioned by valuation period to acquisitions undertaken during high- and low-
valuation periods respectively. Using monthly data from 1984 till 2003, each month is classified through this period as a high- 
(low-) valuation month if the detrended market P/E of that month belongs to the top (bottom) half of all detrended P/Es above 
(below) the past five-year average. All other months are classified as neutral-valuation acquisitions. The results are further 
divided by the method of payment. Cash acquisitions include transactions made solely in cash, or cash and debt. Stock 
acquisitions are defined as transactions made solely in common stock. Mixed payment acquisitions consist of all acquisitions 
in which the payment method is neither pure cash nor pure stock, and methods classified as “other” by SDC. The number of 
bids is reported below the mean. H-L (High minus Low) column represents the differences in mean short-run CARs for the 
five days [-2, +2] around the announcement day (day 0) of a takeover.
 a
 Denotes significance at the 1% level; 
 b
 Denotes 
significance at the 5% level; 
c 
Denotes significance at the 10% level. P-values are provided in parenthesis. 
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Panel A   Small Relative Size  Diversifying Acquisitions  High Book-to-Market    Positive P/E  (P/E Bidder –P/E Market) 
 High Low H-L  High Low H-L  High Low H-L  High Low H-L 
All Bidders 1.23% 
a
 0.21%  1.02%
 b
  2.22% 
a
 0.62% 
c
 1.60%
 a
  1.30% 
a
 0.87%
 c
  0.43%  1.60% 
a
 0.33%  1.27%
 b
 
  
418 
 
281 (0.033)  
 
397 
 
295 
 
(0.002)  
 
412 
 
259 (0.463)  
 
298 
 
241 (0.032) 
                
Public Targets 0.38%  -1.78% 2.16%  1.44%  -1.95% 3.39%
 b
  -0.15%  -2.80%
 c
 2.65%  -1.23%  -4.08%
 a
 2.85% 
  
13 
 
9 (0.366)  
 
44 
 
24 
 
(0.037)  
 
45 
 
21 (0.181)  
 
34 
 
17 (0.189) 
                
Private Targets 1.26%
 a
 0.27% 0.99%
 b
  2.32%
 a
 0.85%
 b
 1.47%
 a
  1.48%
 a
 1.19%
 b
 0.29%  1.96%
 a
 0.66%
 c
 1.30%
 b
 
  
405 
 
272 (0.045)  
 
353 
 
271 (0.006)  
 
367 
 
238 (0.638)  
 
264 
 
224 (0.032) 
                
Cash   0.99% 
a
   0.59% 
c
 0.40%  1.89% 
a
   0.78% 
c
 -1.11%
 c
    1.06% 
a
   0.87%  0.19%    1.22%
 b
     0.14%  1.08% 
  
258 
 
171 (0.402)  
 
215 
 
166 
 
(0.077)  
 
271 
 
148 (0.759)  
 
155 
 
136 (0.102) 
                
Stock 1.69% -1.74% 3.44%
 c
  2.71% 0.32% 2.38%  0.68% -2.37% 3.05%  -0.02% -0.74% 0.72%
 
 
  
22 
 
8 (0.053)  
 
28 
 
13 
 
(0.421)  
 
18 
 
13 (0.443)  
 
36 
 
9 (0.858) 
                
Mixed   1.60% 
c
   -0.27%  1.88%
 c
    2.59% 
a
   0.42%  2.17%
 b
    1.93% 
b
   1.30%  0.63%    2.70%
 a
     0.69%  2.01%
 c
 
 
 
 
138 
 
102 (0.086)  
 
154 
 
116 
 
(0.012)  
 
123 
 
98 (0.607)  
 
107 
 
96 (0.081) 
 Panel B    
                                                                 Large Relative Size                           Non-diversifying Acquisitions                         Low Book-to-Market                 Negative P/E (P/E Bidder –P/E Market) 
All Bidders 2.07%
 a
 0.61% 1.46%
 b
  1.19%
a 
0.18% 1.00%
 c
  2.37%
 a
 0.15% 2.22%
 a
  1.40%
 a
 0.14% 1.26%
 b
 
  
445 
 
284 (0.016)  
 
466 
 
270 
(0.087) 
 
 
376 
 
242 (0.000)  
 
473 
 
266 (0.013) 
                
Public Targets -1.07% -2.62% 1.54%  -3.07% 
b 
-3.11% 
c 
0.04%  -2.00% -1.21% -0.79%  -0.36% -1.07% 0.71% 
  
77 
 
32 (0.341)  
 
46 
 
17 
(0.986) 
 
 
38 
 
17 (0.699)  
 
49 
 
20 (0.679) 
                
Private Targets 2.73%
 a
 1.02%
 b
 1.71%
 a
  1.65%
 a
 0.40% 1.25%
 b
  2.86%
 a
 0.26% 2.60%
 a
  1.61%
 a
 0.24%
 
 1.37%
 b  
 
  
368 
 
252 (0.009)  
 
420 
 
253 (0.038)  
 
338 
 
225 (0.000)  
 
424 
 
246 (0.010) 
                
Cash   1.67%
 a
   0.18% 1.49%
 b
    0.80% 
b 
  0.01% 0.81%    1.95%
 a
   0.01% 1.94%
 a
    1.57%
 a
   0.07% 1.50%
 b
 
  
214 
 
152 (0.049)  
 
257 
 
157 
(0.182) 
 
 
157 
 
134 (0.008)  
 
278 
 
162 (0.011) 
                
Stock 0.64% -1.70% 2.35%  -0.29% 3.76%
c 
3.47%  1.65% -1.25% 2.90%  0.35% -1.61% 1.96% 
  
43 
 
18 (0.421)  
 
37 
 
13 
(0.202) 
 
 
34 
 
9 (0.273)  
 
14 
 
12 (0.513) 
                
Mixed   2.85%
 a
   1.55% 
b
 1.30%    2.08% 
b 
  1.00%  1.08%    2.85%
 a
   0.48%  2.37%
 c
    1.22%
 b  
   0.50%  0.72% 
 
 
 
188 
 
114 (0.186)  
 
172 
 
100 (0.359)  
 
185 
 
99 (0.010)  
 
181 
 
92 (0.457) 
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4.3. Cross-Section Regression Analysis 
To better examine the impact of market valuations on acquirers‟ performance around acquisition 
announcements, we adopt a multiple regression framework, where we employ high-valuation and low-
valuation acquisition measures and various acquisition characteristic controls as independent variables. The 
dependent variable is the acquirer‟s five-day cumulative abnormal return. 
Specifically, we conduct cross-sectional regression analysis of acquirers‟ abnormal returns to examine 
whether differences in acquirer and deal characteristics explain the abnormal return differences found in 
high- and low-valuation acquisitions. We include a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the deal 
was conducted by a bidder within a high-valuation month and zero otherwise. We refer to this binary 
variable as high-valuation deals dummy. We also include a low-valuation deals dummy, defined as a 
binary variable that takes the value of one if the deal took place within a low-valuation month and zero 
otherwise. Since mergers tend to take place in concentrated time periods (waves) and macroeconomic 
conditions, we include controls for past merger activity t-1, defined as the log of one plus the number of 
mergers during the 6-month pre-announcement period, acquirer‟s return t-1, defined as the average 6-
month pre-event return and, most importantly, market return t-1, measured as the average 6-month pre-
event return of the market index. The last variable offers an alternative way to measure whether market 
valuations drive acquisition performance. In addition, the following independent variables which have been 
suggested by theory as key determinants of the market‟s perception of an acquisition are considered: cash 
deals, which is an indicator variable taking the value of one for cash and debt acquisition deals and zero 
otherwise, common stock deals, which is an indicator variable taking the value of one for stock acquisition 
deals and zero otherwise, diversification deals, which is an indicator variable taking the value of one when 
the acquirer and target are not from the same industry and zero otherwise using the two-digit SIC codes, 
book-to-market ratio, calculated as the acquirer‟s market value divided by its net book value one month 
prior to the acquisition announcement, target‟s relative size, defined as the log of the deal value to 
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acquirer‟s market value one month before the acquisition announcement date, acquirer‟s size, defined as 
the log of acquirer‟s market value one month before the acquisition announcement date. 
The results are reported in Table 5. The first regression specification relates acquirers‟ abnormal returns 
of all acquisitions respectively to several acquirer and deal characteristics. The coefficients of regression (1) 
for all acquisitions display that the diversification variable, the relative size of the target, the acquirer return 
t-1 and the market return t-1 have a significantly positive relation with acquirer‟s CARs, which means that 
the market views larger deals, acquisition in different industries, and firms that experienced a price run-up 
even more favourably. Finally, very importantly, the acquirer‟s return increases with the returns of the 
market, which indicates stock market driven acquisitions. 
Given the results from the univariate analysis, investors‟ sentiment theory predicts that high-valuation 
periods will be associated with positive CARs, while low-valuation periods should have no relation with 
any acquirers‟ gains. Consistent with the results from the univariate tests, regression (2) for all acquisitions 
shows that high-valuation acquirers have a positive and significant association with abnormal 
announcement returns. The dummy variable indicating high-valuation deals carries a coefficient of 0.011 
and is statistically significant at the 1% level, suggesting that the market offers a premium to high-
valuation acquirers by approximately 1.1% over the five-day window. On the other hand the low-valuation 
deals dummy carries a negative but insignificant coefficient. In regression (3), which includes the control 
variables, the coefficient of the high-valuation deals variable is again 0.011 and is also statistically 
significant at the one percent level. This suggests that after controlling for deal and acquirer characteristics 
high-valuation acquisitions are associated with an abnormal return that is 1.1% larger than that of other 
valuation periods. In addition, the coefficient of the market return t-1 is also positive and significant 
suggesting that the market favours acquisitions undertaken when its valuation increases. The same 
significant sign is reported for acquirer return over the pre-event period and relative size of the target to 
bidder as the market reacts positively with firms that experienced good past performance and with larger 
deals. All other variables, including merger activity (waves), are insignificant. This is an indication that 
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merger waves do not seem to drive results inconsistent with predictions of the neoclassical theory. Overall 
the results suggest that deal characteristics have no distinct bearing on abnormal returns five days 
surrounding the acquisition announcement. This evidence provides additional support for the theoretical 
prediction of the investors‟ optimistic beliefs. Optimism about mergers overall generates a positive 
autocorrelation in announcement returns while overall optimism about firms can lead to a positive 
correlation between CARs and the returns in the stock market. There is no way, however, of using the 
announcement results to distinguish these two issues. A long-run analysis is therefore essential in order to 
draw fruitful conclusions about the real source of market valuations effect on acquirer‟s performance. 
Table 5  
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Regression Analyses of Cumulative Abnormal Returns on High and Low- Valuation 
Acquisitions 
 
Dependent Variables 
All 
(1) (2) (3) 
Intercept 
0.016 
 (0.336) 
0.061
 a
 
 (0.000) 
0.012 
 (0.475) 
    
High-Valuation deals 
(Dummy = 1 If Target is Acquired in a high-valuation month) 
 
0.011
 a
 
(0.000) 
0.011
 a
 
(0.001) 
    
Low-Valuation deals 
(Dummy = 1 If Target is Acquired in a low-valuation month) 
 
-0.002 
(0.539) 
0.003 
(0.484) 
    
Cash deals 
(Dummy = 1 If Target is Acquired with Cash and Debt) 
-0.001  
(0.789) 
 
-0.009  
(0.753) 
    
Common stock deals 
(Dummy = 1 If Target is Acquired with Common Stock) 
-0.002 
 (0.847) 
 
-0.002 
 (0.820) 
    
Diversifying deals 
(Dummy = 1 If Target and Acquirer are in Different Industry) 
0.005
 c
   
(0.080) 
 
0.005
 c
   
(0.059) 
    
B/M 
0.000 
(0.982) 
 
-0.001 
(0.785) 
    
Log of Relative Size of Target to Acquirer 0.010
 a
   
(0.001) 
 
0.010
 a
   
(0.001) 
    
Log of Acquirer Size  
-0.001 
 (0.563) 
 
-0.002 
 (0.430) 
    
Acquirer Return t-1 
2.046
 a
   
(0.006) 
 
1.965
 a
   
(0.008) 
    
Market Return t-1 6.238
 a
 
 (0.001) 
 
4.499
 b
 
 (0.027) 
    
Merger Activity t-1 
0.001 
 (0.714) 
 
0.002 
 (0.627) 
    
F-Statistic 
4.675  
(0.000) 
8.726  
(0.000) 
4.817  
(0.000) 
    
N 2302 2973 2302 
    
R² 1.80% 0.58% 2.26% 
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This table presents regression estimates of the acquirer‟s five-day cumulative abnormal return on acquisitions for high- and low-
valuation deals, controlling for deal and acquirer characteristics. All acquirers are publicly traded firms listed on the London 
Stock Exchange (LSE). Using monthly data from 1984 till 2003, each month is classified through this period as a high- (low-) 
valuation month if the detrended market P/E of that month belongs to the top (bottom) half of all detrended P/Es above (below) 
the past five-year average. All other months are classified as neutral-valuation acquisitions. High-valuation deals, is an indicator 
variable that takes the value of one if the deal is conducted within a high-valuation classified month. We refer to this dummy as 
high-valuation deals dummy. Low-valuation deals, is an indicator variable, defined as a binary variable that takes the value of 
one if the deal is made within a low-valuation classified month. Cash deals, is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 for cash 
and debt acquisition deals and zero otherwise. Common stock deals, is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 for stock 
acquisition deals and zero otherwise. Diversification deals, is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 when the acquirer and 
target for acquisition are not in the same industry and zero otherwise. Book-to-market ratio is the net book value divided by its 
market value and is estimated one month before the acquisition announcement. Target‟s relative size, is defined as the log of the 
target deal value to acquirer‟s market value one month before the acquisition announcement date, and acquirer‟s size, is defined 
as the log of acquirer‟s market value one month before the acquisition announcement date. Acquirer‟s return t-1 is defined as the 
average 6-month pre-event return. Market return t-1 represents the average 6-month pre-event return of the market index. Merger 
activityt-1 is defined as the log of one plus the number of mergers during the 6-month pre-announcement period. 
a
 Denotes 
significance at the 1% level; 
 b
 Denotes significance at the 5% level; 
c 
Denotes significance at the 10% level. P-values are 
provided in parenthesis. 
 
5. Post-acquisition Long-term Performance 
5.1. Acquirer Post-Acquisition Returns and Market Valuations 
We have reported that bidders engaged in acquisitions during high-valuation periods generate superior 
abnormal returns relative to acquirers that made acquisitions during low-valuation periods. We have also 
argued that a potential explanation of our announcement results is the investors‟ sentiment theory. To 
confirm that investor sentiment is a driving force behind shareholders‟ wealth effects, our analysis horizon 
is extended to the long-run. If the relationship between the CAR and the valuation variables occurs because 
of over-optimism, then we should pick up a reversal of the CAR over time as the merged company begins 
to have a track record. Hence, to assess whether the difference in stock price performance between high-
valuation and low-valuation acquisitions, respectively, is consistent with the expectation of the market, we 
examine the post-acquisition stock price performance of acquirers.  
If bidders generate higher returns by engaging in high-valuation acquisitions than those that engage in 
low-valuation acquisitions, time-series portfolios of high-valuation acquirers should be associated with 
higher returns relative to an explicit asset pricing model. Fama and French (1993) suggest that a three-
factor model may explain the time series of stock returns. While several researchers argue that the size and 
book-to-market factor-mimicking portfolios may not represent risk factors, we basically use the Fama-
French (1993) three-factor model to assess whether high-valuation acquirers earn higher returns for bearing 
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additional risks. We use the intercept from the time-series regressions of the high-valuation and low-
valuation acquirers to measure whether the latter earn higher returns for bearing additional risk controlling 
for market, size, and book-to-market effects.
17
 Intercepts are estimated for 1 and 3 years subsequent to the 
acquisition announcement.  
Table 6 reports the regression results. An interesting finding that emerges from the 3-year long-term 
performance analysis and in sharp contrast with the announcement returns is that most intercepts for both 
high- and low-valuation acquirers are negative and statistically significant at conventional levels.
18
 The 
negative magnitude of the intercepts systematically increases, as we move from the first to the third year 
after the acquisition, indicating that the post-acquisition stock price performance deteriorates with time. 
The same pattern exists for all financing deals (except for cash). The market‟s positive or non-negative 
reaction to acquisition announcements in comparison to the harmful post-acquisition stock performance 
points out that the market overestimates the operational efficiencies and synergy gains for both high- and 
low-valuation acquisitions. The market learns only gradually that many of the mergers undertaken during 
bullish periods were not carefully evaluated and were indeed bad deals. In summary, this differential 
between market anticipation and post-acquisition stock performance suggests that the market, on average, 
was optimistic about the future prospects of these mergers. 
19
 
Interestingly, this result is not driven by public deals as they generate insignificant returns. However, 
public acquisitions with stock are negative and significant (-1.98%), with stock deals undertaken during 
high-valuation periods being on average more negative than low-valuation stock acquisitions. This 
evidence is in line with the view that during stock market booms, managers are more likely to be affected 
by hubris and get involved in fame-enhancing but value-destroying acquisitions. Public acquisitions are 
                                                 
17
 While the intercept in these regressions appears to be similar in spirit to Jensen‟s alpha in the context of CAPM, which 
controls for size and book-to-market factors in addition to the overall market factor, we do not interpret it as a measure of 
portfolio performance attribution. 
18
 For robustness reasons, we employ the market index (TOTMKUK) itself as a proxy of market valuations and we obtain 
qualitatively similar results for long-run analysis which are not reported for brevity but are available upon request. 
19
 Note that our evidence does not suggest that mergers by no means occur as a result of shocks. There may also be other driving 
force, for example shocks may lead to optimism on part of investors. 
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ideal in this context, since they are more exposed to the spotlight and therefore increase managerial reputation. Moreover, such acquisitions 
correspond to much larger transaction and bidder equity values, and hence the market‟s valuation effect is more pronounced. Private 
acquisitions, on the other hand, generate overall negative abnormal returns and lose more wealth when the transaction is announced in low-
valuation periods. Overall, our results are consistent with the hypothesis that high-valuation acquirers‟ returns are caused by investors‟ over-
optimism, possibly in addition to other factors.   
Table 6  
Calendar-Time Portfolio Regressions (CTPRs) of Long-Run Stock Returns using the Fama-French 3-Factor Model 
 
 All Cash Stock Mixed 
 All High Low All High Low All High Low All High Low 
                           Panel A:  1 year 
All Bidders 
0.03%  -0.16% 
 
-0.10%
 
 0.10%  0.11%  0.12% -0.49%
 
 -0.99% -0.01% 0.28%  0.15%  0.55% 
 
 
1320 855 465 
 
735 
 
468 
 
267 
 
87 
 
63 
 
24 
 
498 
 
324 
 
174 
             
Public Targets 
-0.06%  -0.84%
 c
  
 
0.88% 
 
0.48% 0.59% 0.27% -1.03%
 
 -1.61%
 b
 0.88% -0.71%
 
 -1.29%
 c
 -0.19%
 
 
 
 
123 86 37 53 33 20 35 26 9 35 27 8 
             
Private Targets 
0.09%
 
 0.20% -0.11%
 
 0.08% 0.13% 0.08% 0.29% 1.35% -0.86% 0.61%
 b
 0.74% 0.62% 
 
1197 769 428 682 247 247 52 37 15 463 297 166 
                             Panel B: 3 years 
All Bidders -0.54%
 b
 -0.37% 
b 
-0.96%
 a
 -0.27%  -0.12%  -0.83%
 b 
 -1.91%
 a
 -1.32%
 b
 -1.65%
 a  
 -0.59%
 a
 -0.23% -0.56%
 c
 
 
 
1230 855 375 
 
692 
 
468 
 
224 
 
83 
 
63 
 
20 
 
455 
 
324 
 
131 
             
Public Targets 
-0.33%
 
 -0.01%
 
 0.32%
 
0.55% 0.86%
 c
 0.15% -1.98%
 a
 -0.96%
 
 -0.51%
 
 -0.26%
 
 -0.55%
 
 0.58%
 
 
 
 
118 86 32 
 
52 
 
33 
 
19 
 
33 
 
26 
 
7 
 
33 
 
27 
 
6 
             
Private Targets -0.50%
 b  
 -0.34%
 c
 -1.04%
 a
 -0.32%
 
 -0.16% -0.85%
 b
 -1.47%
 a
 -0.73% -1.58%
 b
 -0.40%
 c
 -0.14% -0.57%
 c
 
  
1112 769 343 640 435 205 50 37 13 422 297 125 
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This table presents Fama and French (1993) 3-factor alphas for merger portfolios of all, high- and low-valuation acquirers. All 
acquirers are publicly traded firms listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). The sample consists of successful acquisition 
deals completed over the 1984-2002 (2000) period for 1- (3- ) year analysis as identified from the Thomson Financial Securities 
Data Corporation’s (SDC) Global Financing database. Using monthly data from 1984 till 2003, each month is classified 
through this period as a high- (low-) valuation month if the detrended market P/E of that month belongs to the top (bottom) half 
of all detrended P/Es above (below) the past five-year average. All other months are classified as neutral-valuation acquisitions. 
Panel A reports alphas for 1 year post-event, Panel B for 3 years post-event. Calendar time regression alphas are also reported by 
method of payment used in the transaction (Cash, Stock, Mixed). Cash acquisitions include transactions made solely in cash, or 
cash and debt. Stock acquisitions are defined as transactions made solely in common stock. Mixed payment acquisitions consist 
of all acquisitions in which the payment method is neither pure cash nor pure stock, and methods classified as “other” by SDC. 
Acquirers enter the portfolio on the announcement day of the successful takeover and remain for 12 and 36 months, respectively. 
Portfolios are rebalanced each month to include firms that have just completed a takeover. We estimate the calendar-time return 
under the Fama-French 3-factor model with the following regression: 
ittitiftmtiiftpt HMLhSMBsRRaRR   )(  
The numbers in percentage represent the reported FF , which is the average of the individual, firm-specific intercepts. 
Respectively, a, b and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels based on heteroskedasticity adjusted 
standard errors.
 
 The number of firms is reported below the monthly average abnormal returns. 
 
5.2. Acquirer Post-Acquisition Returns by Book-to-Market  
The post-merger results obtained so far could be explained as market valuation periods are just proxies for 
firm valuation. According to Rau and Vermaelen (1998), if firm-specific misvaluations hold, we would 
expect acquirers with high book-to-market to outperform those with low book-to-market in the long-run. 
To clarify whether acquirer‟s long-term performance is due to market-wide (mis)valuations or firm-specific 
(mis)valuations, we partition our sample equally into high, medium and low book-to-market acquirers, 
according to their book-to-market ratio one month prior to the acquisition announcement. Each sub-sample 
is again split into high- and low-valuation periods and we investigate the 
performance of acquirers for each of these three book-to-market categories. The results for the 1- and 3-
year post-event windows are presented in Table 7. Overall, acquirers seem to generate in most cases 
insignificant abnormal returns irrespective of the book-to-market category for both high- and low-valuation 
acquisitions. When we examine the return differentials between the high and low book-to-market 
acquirers‟ returns in both high- and low-valuation periods we find insignificant mean differences. Hence, 
we conclude that firm-specific misvaluations do not drive acquisitions for different valuation periods.  
Table 7 
Effect of Market-Wide Valuations: Calendar-Time Portfolio Regressions (CTPRs) By Acquirer Book-to-Market Ratio using the 
Fama-French 3-Factor Model 
 
 
 24 
 1 year  3 years 
 High Low High Low 
High B/M 0.19% -0.37% -0.05% -0.81%
 c
 
 302 124 302 85 
     
Medium B/M -0.18% 0.42% 0.02% 0.02%
 
 
 219 165 219 135 
     
Low B/M -0.03% 1.29%
 c
 -0.62%
 b
 -0.97%
 a 
 
 267 117 267 101 
      
H–L  0.48% -1.18%  0.51% 0.03% 
 (95) (108)  (167) (120) 
 
This table examines the impact of the market state by controlling for acquirer book-to-market ratio. All acquirers are publicly traded firms listed on 
the London Stock Exchange (LSE). We equally divide the sample into high, medium and low book-to-market acquirers, and examine the 1- and 3-
year performance of acquirers making acquisitions during high- and low-valuation periods for each book-to-market category. Using monthly data 
from 1984 till 2002, each month is classified through this period as a high- (low-) valuation month if the detrended market P/E of that month 
belongs to the top (bottom) half of all detrended P/Es above (below) the past five-year. All other months are classified as neutral-valuation 
acquisitions. Acquirers are divided into equal subsamples of high, medium and low book-to-market firms based on their book-to-market ratio one 
month prior to the acquisition announcement. Bidder’s book-to-market ratio is the net book value divided by its market value and is estimated one 
month before the acquisition announcement date. Acquirers enter the portfolio on the announcement day of the successful takeover and remain 
for 12 and 36 months, respectively. Portfolios are rebalanced each month to include firms that have just completed a takeover. We estimate the 
calendar-time return under the Fama-French 3-factor model as in Table 6. 
 
5.3. Acquirer Post-Acquisition Returns and Price Reversals 
In this section we investigate whether our long-run stock return results are caused by long-term 
price reversals. It could be argued that our general finding that high-valuation acquirers exhibit 
positive abnormal returns around the announcement date but negative and significant abnormal returns 
in the long-run reflects momentum followed by long-term reversals. In other words, it could be the 
case that acquirers that experienced positive returns for some months prior to the acquisition (high-
valuation acquisitions), are subject to a brief period of persistence followed by long-term negative 
returns. 
To investigate this, we firstly measure the pre-announcement performance of each bidder during high- 
and low-valuation periods. Specifically, for each acquirer, we calculate its calendar time abnormal returns 
for the six months preceding the acquisition announcement. Acquisitions of high-and low-valuation bidders 
are ranked according to their pre-event abnormal returns and placed into two equal groups (i.e., top and 
bottom groups). As a result, we sort our sample into four categories: i) High-valuation acquisitions that 
experience the highest pre-event abnormal returns, ii) High-valuation acquisitions that exhibit the lowest 
pre-event abnormal returns, iii) Low-valuation acquisitions that experience the highest pre-event abnormal 
returns, and iv) Low-valuation acquisitions that exhibit the lowest pre-event abnormal returns. If our results 
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are simply a manifestation of momentum and reversals and have nothing to do with the period the 
acquisition was undertaken, then any support or contradiction of our interpretation will be shown for 
acquirers that have experienced extremely high or low pre-event returns. Hence, if price reversals drive our 
long-run results, we expect that high- (low-) valuation acquirers that generated high pre-event returns 
should have negative post-acquisition performance and those who experienced the lowest pre-event returns 
to have positive post-acquisition performance.  
The results are presented in Table 8. For high-valuation acquirers that experienced the largest 6-month 
pre-event returns (4.95%), the 3-year long-run returns are negative and significant (-0.54%). This pattern 
could be attributed to price reversals. However, high-valuation acquirers that experienced the most 
negative abnormal pre-event returns (-2.86%) still exhibit poor performance in the long-run (-0.36%). 
These negative returns cannot be attributed to price reversals, as those firms were found to perform also 
poorly prior to the acquisition announcement. Similarly, for low-valuation acquirers that had the lowest 
pre-event returns (-2.35%), and those with the highest pre-event returns (2.87%), post-event performance is 
also negative and significant (-1.22% and -0.39%, respectively) reflecting that our results are not an 
outcome of price reversals. Therefore it can be argued that market valuations affect managerial decisions 
with respect to the quality of the acquisition and lead the acquirer‟s performance. 
Table 8 
Calendar-Time Portfolio Regressions (CTPRs) of Acquirers with the Best and Worst Pre-event Performance using the 
Fama-French 3-Factor Model 
 High-Valuation Acquirers  Low-Valuation Acquirers 
 Top group 
(50%) in 
terms of pre-
event returns 
 Bottom 
group (50%) 
in terms of 
pre-event 
returns 
 Top group 
(50%) in terms 
of pre-event 
returns 
 Bottom group 
(50%) in terms 
of pre-event 
returns 
Average 6-month 
pre-event CTPR 
4.86%
 a
  -2.93%
 a
  2.82%
 a
  -3.36%
 a
 
        
 
Average 1-year 
CTPR 
0.04% 
 
0.05% 
 
-0.70%
 b
 
 
-0.57%
 
 
 446  406  213  252 
        
        
Average 6-month 
pre-event CTPR 
4.95%
 a
  -2.86%
 a
  2.87%
 a
  -2.35%
 a
 
        
 
Average 3-year 
CTPR 
-0.54%
 b
  -0.36%
 c
  -0.39%
 c
  -1.22%
 a
 
 437  398  177  198 
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This table presents the pre-announcement (6-month) as well as the post-event 1- and 3-year monthly average calendar time abnormal 
returns of four categories of acquirers. All acquirers are publicly traded firms listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). Firstly, acquirers 
are divided into two groups, high and low-valuation acquirers respectively. High- (low)-valuation acquirers are the one who acquired firms 
during periods of high- (low) stock market valuations. Using monthly data from 1984 till 2002, each month is classified through this period 
as a high- (low-) valuation month if the detrended market P/E of that month belongs to the top (bottom) half of all detrended P/Es above 
(below) the past five-year. All other months are classified as neutral-valuation acquisitions. The two groups created above are further 
subdivided into four categories: i) High-valuation acquirers who had the highest six-month pre-announcement monthly average abnormal 
returns, ii) High-valuation acquirers who had the lowest six-month pre-announcement monthly average abnormal returns, iii) Low-
valuation acquirers who had the highest six-month pre-announcement monthly average abnormal returns, iv) Low-valuation acquirers who 
had the lowest six-month pre-announcement monthly average abnormal returns. Acquirers enter the portfolio on the announcement day of 
the successful takeover and remain for 12 and 36 months, respectively. Portfolios are rebalanced each month to include firms that have 
just completed a takeover. We estimate the calendar-time return under the Fama-French 3-factor model with the following regression as in 
Table 6: 
 
5.4. Acquirer Post-Acquisition Returns by Excluding Multiple Deals 
We finally conduct a robustness test to further enhance the above evidence. Given that some 
bidders conduct multiple acquisitions during a short-period of time there could be the case that there 
is to an extent noise when computing post-acquisition returns. Particularly a 12-month or, mainly, a 
36-month return series may be affected by inter-effects sourcing from the same bidder acquiring 
within high and low-valuation periods. In other words, for example, part of the 36-month return 
series of a classified high-valuation acquirer might also be part of the return series of the same 
acquirer that makes another acquisition a few months later during a classified low-valuation month. 
Hence, in order to get a „pure‟ picture of acquirers‟ performance in different valuation periods we 
exclude bidders whose return series coincides in the calculation of both high and low-valuation 
period‟s portfolios. 
Table 9 reports the one- and three-year returns after excluding multiple deals by same acquirers 
in high and low valuation months. The evidence is similar to our long-run findings in table 7. 
Looking at the 3-year analysis we observe again that most intercepts for both high- and low-valuation 
acquirers are negative and statistically significant at conventional levels.  In general, the results are 
also consistent with table 7 when we partition our sample by method of payment and target 
ownership status. Overall, the findings further confirm that the market was, on average, optimistic 
about the future prospects of these mergers. 
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Table 9. Calendar-Time Portfolio Regressions (CTPRs) of Acquirers after the Exclusion of Multiple Deals By the Same Acquirer in High and Low-Valuation 
Months using the Fama-French 3-Factor Model 
 
 
This table presents Fama and French (1993) 3-factor alphas for merger portfolios of all, high- and low-valuation acquirers after the exclusion of multiple deals by 
the same acquirer in high and low-valuation periods. All acquirers are publicly traded firms listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). The sample consists of 
successful acquisition deals completed over the 1984-2002 (2000) period for 1- (3- ) year analysis as identified from the Thomson Financial Securities Data 
Corporation’s (SDC) Global Financing database. Using monthly data from 1984 till 2003, each month is classified through this period as a high- (low-) valuation 
month if the detrended market P/E of that month belongs to the top (bottom) half of all detrended P/Es above (below) the past five-year average. All other months 
are classified as neutral-valuation acquisitions. Panel A reports alphas for 1 year post-event, Panel B for 3 years post-event. Calendar time regression alphas are 
also reported by method of payment used in the transaction (Cash, Stock, Mixed). Cash acquisitions include transactions made solely in cash, or cash and debt. 
Stock acquisitions are defined as transactions made solely in common stock. Mixed payment acquisitions consist of all acquisitions in which the payment method 
is neither pure cash nor pure stock, and methods classified as “other” by SDC. Acquirers enter the portfolio on the announcement day of the successful takeover 
and remain for 12 and 36 months, respectively. Portfolios are rebalanced each month to include firms that have just completed a takeover. We estimate the 
calendar-time return under the Fama-French 3-factor model as in Table 6.  
 All Cash Stock Mixed 
 All High Low All High Low All High Low All High Low 
                           Panel A:  1 year 
All Bidders 
-0.01%  -0.01% 
 
-0.17%
 
 0.12%  0.09%  0.12% -0.49%
 
 -0.99% -0.01% 0.24%  0.12%  0.51% 
 
 
1303 846 457 
 
725 
 
462 
 
263 
 
87 
 
63 
 
24 
 
491 
 
321 
 
170 
             
Public Targets 
-0.02%  -0.75%
 c
  
 
0.88% 
 
0.56% 0.80% 0.27% -1.03%
 
 -1.61%
 b
 0.88% -0.71%
 
 -1.29%
 c
 -0.19%
 
 
 
 
122 85 37 52 32 20 35 26 9 35 27 8 
             
Private Targets 
0.06%
 
 0.16% -0.17%
 
 0.10% 0.10% 0.08% 0.29% 1.35% -0.86% 0.58%
 c  
 0.71% 0.59% 
 
1181 761 420 673 430 243 52 37 15 456 294 162 
                             Panel B: 3 years 
All Bidders -0.49%
 b
 -0.47% 
b 
-1.62%
 a
 -0.22%  -0.30%  -1.41%
 a   
 -2.12%
 a
 -1.75%
 a   
 -1.55%
 b    
 -0.51%
 b  
 -0.34% -0.43%
 
 
 
 
1020 751 269 
 
558 
 
400 
 
158 
 
72 
 
56 
 
16 
 
390 
 
295 
 
95 
             
Public Targets 
-0.29%
 
 0.20%
 
 0.11%
 
0.55% 0.90%
 c
 0.05% -2.38%
 b  
 -0.89%
 
 -0.99%
 
 -0.21%
 
 -0.42%
 
 0.80%
 
 
 
 
104 78 26 
 
47 
 
31 
 
16 
 
29 
 
24 
 
5 
 
28 
 
23 
 
5 
             
Private Targets -0.46%
 b  
 -0.56%
 b  
 -1.63%
 a
 -0.29%
 
 -0.35% -1.42%
 a  
 -1.54%
 a
 -1.28%
 c
 -1.26%
 c  
 -0.29%
 
 -0.29% -0.47%
 
 
  
916 673 243 511 369 142 43 32 11 362 272 90 
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6. Conclusion    
This paper examines whether market misvaluations drive acquisitions and/or acquirers‟ returns. 
Specifically, we focus on hot markets and address the fundamental question of whether investor 
sentiment (optimism) is a driving force of acquirers‟ performance. We test this hypothesis and 
conclude that optimistic beliefs of investors over bullish periods are a significant factor of acquisition 
returns. If market participants are optimistic about the synergies that will occur from the merger, then 
they will bid up the stock of the merging firms. However, as the performance of the merged firm is 
revealed over time, investors may revise their views about the quality of the merger, losing their 
optimism. To explain the sources of larger high-valuation returns at the announcement, we look the 
long-run stock returns of acquiring firms. Acquisitions announced during stock market boom periods 
lead to long-run declines in the bidder‟s stock price. Overall, the results show that, ceteris paribus, 
the positive short-run reaction to an announcement is fully reversed over the next one to three years. 
Our results are not sensitive to firm-specific misvaluations and various acquisition and deal 
characteristics. 
These findings of course do not imply that investor sentiment is the only driving force of 
acquirer‟s returns. Our results have important implications for contracting practices and 
organizational design. In a sense, managerial motives are likely to be additionally included in the 
acquisition decision. If investors have unrealistic expectations about the synergies from a merger, that 
still does not explain why a manager should make an acquisition. Manager‟s compensation may 
initiate managers to conduct further -even bad- acquisitions to take advantage of the increase in 
firm‟s stock announcement returns, based on their previous experience in conduction of acquisitions. 
This could be an alternative explanation to positive announcement returns in the short-run for high-
valuation acquisitions followed by negative post-returns in the long-run. 
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